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Economists have presented two contrasting views of government regulation of economic 
activity.    Under  the  Public  Choice  view  (Stigler  (1971),  regulation  is  acquired  by 
industries, and is designed and operated for their benefit, through the increased market 
power that regulation allows.  By contrast, the Public Interest perspective, as initially 
suggested  by  Pigou  (1938),  holds  that  industry  will  be  fraught  with  inefficiencies 
stemming from market failures of all kinds, if left to its own devices.  Regulation is 
therefore required to achieve socially efficient outcomes.  Both perspectives suggest that 
entry  regulation  in  particular  will  have  an  impact  on  industrial  structure  by  directly 
influencing the costs of starting a new enterprise in a given industry, but differ in their 
views on the relative tradeoff between the correction of externalities and the creation of 
market power.  In order to appropriately assess the extent of this tradeoff requires some 
empirical sense of the actual distortions that may be caused by regulatory burdens.  That 
is the purpose of this paper. 
  There  exists  a  nascent  empirical  literature  examining  the  impact  of  entry 
regulation on economic outcomes.  Two recent papers take contrasting approaches on this 
issue.  Djankov, La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
1 (2002) document significant 
differences  across  countries  in  the  ease  with  which  firms  may  open  new  businesses.  
They go on to examine a number of country-level outcomes and find that, consistent with 
the Public Choice view, entry regulation is associated with higher corruption and larger 
unofficial economies, but not higher quality of public or private goods.  Bertrand and 
Kramarz (2002) look more closely at the effects of entry regulation on employment of the 
                                                 
1 Referred to as DLLS below  
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retail  sector  in  France,  taking  advantage  of  regional  and  temporal  variation  in  the 
stringency  with  which  entry  regulation  was  applied.    They  find  that  entry  regulation 
decreases retail employment, partly due to the increase in concentration and the ensuing 
price upturns.  
In  our  paper,  we  take  an  approach  that  empirically  straddles  the  two  papers 
described  above.    We  will  take  advantage  of  heterogeneity  across  industries  in  their 
natural  barriers  and  growth  opportunities  to  examine  whether  some  industries  are 
differentially affected in countries with high levels of entry regulation.  This will allow us 
to  examine  how  entry  regulation  differentially  influences  industrial  structure,  as  a 
function  of  industry  characteristics,  and  the  opportunities  available  to  firms  in  that 
industry. This approach contrasts with DLLS, who examine the impact of regulation only 
at the country level – our approach will allow  for the inclusion of both country and 
industry fixed-effects, which mitigates some concerns of unobserved heterogeneity and 
reverse causality.  Furthermore, DLLS examine only ultimate (social) outcomes of entry 
regulation, rather than the direct impact upon industry structure that would be the primary 
consequence  of  regulations  according  to  the  Public  Choice  view  (in  its  “acquired 
regulation” formulation).  Also, in contrast to Bertrand and Kramarz, by considering a 
range  of  industries  and  countries,  we  are  able  to  study  the  differential  impact  of 
regulation across industries, and reflect on how it varies across a much broader range of 
institutional structures.   
  Our methodology is similar to the approach popularized by Rajan and Zingales  
(1998), in that we utilize U.S. data at the industry level to proxy for underlying industry 
characteristics  that  have  arisen  in  an  economy  with  relatively  few  institutional  
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constraints.  Also following the approach of Rajan and Zingales, we then examine how 
the relation between (underlying) industry characteristics and actual industry structure is 
affected by the extent of entry regulation.  We report three primary sets of findings; the 
intuition behind each is summarized in the following paragraph.   
First,  we  consider  the  effect  of  entry  regulation  on  the  (static)  structure  of 
industry.  We find that in industries with high natural barriers to entry (and hence little 
need for additional barriers through regulation), entry regulation has little impact on the 
quantity and average size of firms in an industry.  By contrast, in industries with low 
natural entry barriers, countries with high entry regulation have few, large firms, relative 
to  less  regulated  economies.    Surprisingly,  there  is  no  relation  between  natural  entry 
barriers and overall industry share of manufacturing, as a function of entry regulation.  
Second, utilizing firm-level data, we show that operating margins are relatively high in 
low barrier industries in high entry regulation countries (relative to high natural barrier 
industries).  Together, these results suggest that, while entry regulation does not distort 
intersectoral allocation, the within-industry organization of production is affected by the 
regulation  of  entry.    We  then  examine  the  impact  of  entry  regulation  on  industry 
dynamics, by analyzing the ability of industries to take advantage of shocks to growth 
opportunities.  These results parallel those on static industry structure: in countries with 
high entry regulation, industries respond to growth opportunities through the expansion 
of existing firms, while in countries with low entry regulation, the response is primarily 
through the creation of new firms.  Moreover, we find that the investment response to 
growth opportunities is stronger in countries with low entry regulation, when we limit the  
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sample  to  richer  countries.    Once  again,  we  find  that  the  total  sectoral  response  is 
invariant to the level of regulation.   
Overall,  our  results  provide  a  consistent  body  of  evidence  suggesting  that 
regulation distorts the (within) structure of industry, promoting industry concentration, 
but does not have measurable effects on intersectoral allocations.  It is plausible that there 
may  be  some  socially  beneficial  elements  to  the  entry  regulations  that  we  examine.  
However,  given  the  distortions  that  we  uncover,  combined  with  the  absence  of  any 
measurable benefits, we argue in our discussion that the results collectively favor the 
Public Choice view of regulation. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  will  be  structured  as  follows:  In  Section  1,  we  further 
elaborate on our methodology.  Section 2 describes the datasets that we have brought 
together for this paper.  Our main results and their interpretation are presented in Section 
3, and Section 4 contains our conclusions and discussion. 
 
1.  Methodology 
1.A.  Entry Regulation and Industry Structure 
Our  first  approach  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  there  exist  industries  that  have 
‘naturally’ high entry barriers.  The underlying sources of these barriers are of secondary 
importance to our study, but may include a range of factors, such as capital intensiveness 
of production or technological complexity.  For our purposes, what is necessary is that 
there  exists  some  component  of  these  barriers  that  is  industry  specific  and  invariant  
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across countries, say Ki, where i indexes industry.
2  Furthermore, we observe that models 
of entry with fixed costs generally predict a convex relationship between the size of fixed 
costs and the number of firms in an industry.
3  Thus, we may consider the total (fixed) 
cost of entry to be Ki + Rc, where Rc is the cost associated with entry  regulation in 
country c.  Since the number of firms, Nic is convex in Ki + Rc,  0
2 > ¶ ¶ ¶ c i ic R K N .  For 
constant  demand,  it  also  follows  that  for  average  firm  size,  Qic/Nic, 
0 ) / (
2 < ¶ ¶ ¶ c i ic R K N Q ,  where  Qic  is  total  industry  output.    The  intuition  is 
straightforward:  If  ‘natural’  industry  entry  barriers  Ki  are  extremely  high  (as  in,  say, 
petroleum refineries or tobacco), then the marginal impact of an increase in a (relatively 
small) cost of entry, Rc, will be small.  However, if industry entry barriers are close to 
zero, the marginal impact of Rc may be quite significant. 
  A suitable test for this conjecture would examine the interaction between natural 
entry barriers and entry regulation. If the presence of natural entry barriers mitigates the 
impact  of  entry  regulation  on  industry  structure,  we  would  expect  to  see  this  effect 
empirically  in  the  interaction  of  (natural)  entry  barriers  and  entry  regulation.  Our 
regressions will thus take the form:  
 
(1)  Log(No. of firms)ic= ￿i + ￿c + ￿*(Entry Barrier)i*(Entry Regulation)c + ￿ic 
(2)  Log(Avg. Firm Size)ic= ￿i + ￿c + ￿*(Entry Barrier)i*(Entry Regulation)c + ￿ic 
 
                                                 
2 Dunne and Roberts (1991) describe a set of industry characteristics that explain much of inter-industry 
variations  in  turnover  rates.  Furthermore,  they  find  that  the  correlation  between  those  industry 
characteristics and the industry turnover pattern is stable over time, which they take as an indication these 
correlation  actually  result  from  differences  in  technologies  across  industries.  This  is  confirmed  by  the 
evidence presented by Cable and Schwalbach (1991) on systematic inter-industry figures.  
3 This is true, for example, of a simple Cournot model with free entry, and (fixed) linear demand.  
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For our main results, we will use firm turnover (defined below as entry + exit) in the 
United  States,  USTurnoveri,  as  a  proxy  for  industry-specific  entry  barriers.
4    High 
turnover will be taken  as a sign of  relative  ease of entry, i.e., turnover is negatively 
correlated with entry barriers.
5  This has been suggested by Dunne and Roberts (1991). 
They report high inter-industry correlations between entry and exit figures, justifying the 
characterization  of  industries  with  high  natural  entry  barriers  as  those  exhibiting 
relatively high entry and exit barriers. More specifically, they argue that industries can be 
characterized by turnover ratios as a function of industry-specific levels of sunk costs.
6  
That  suggests  translating  (1)  and  (2)  into  the  following  specifications  that  may  be 
estimated with available data:  
 
(3)  Log(No. of firms)ic= ￿i + ￿c + ￿*USTurnoveri*(Entry Regulation)c + ￿ic 
(4)  Log(Avg. Firm Size)ic= ￿i + ￿c + ￿*USTurnoveri*(Entry Regulation)c + ￿ic 
 
As suggested above, we predict a negative coefficient on the interaction term in (3) and a 
positive coefficient on the interaction term in (4).
7 
                                                 
4 As a robustness check, we also used the mean industry-level turnover from a set of seven developed 
countries (Belgium, Canada, Germany, U.K., Norway, Portugal and the USA). Our results are robust to this 
alternative specification. 
5 One may think of three ‘classes’ of entry barriers: (1) regulatory (2) ‘technical’ exogenous (e.g., capital 
intensity)  (3)  endogenous  but  consistent  across  countries  (e.g.,  advertising).  Anything  else  will  be 
effectively in our error term.  Now, our measure of turnover in the U.S. incorporates both (2) and (3), and 
we cannot differentiate between a technological need for scale, versus an industry’s affinity for creating 
entry barriers through investment. Analyzing these differences would be interesting, since responses may 
vary according to different types of barriers; we leave this exercise, however, for future research. From our 
perspective, it does not matter why there exist barriers, simply that they exist and that some component of 
them is consistent across countries. 
6  An alternative  measure of  natural entry barriers could  be given by considering just the  ‘entry’ rate; 
however, this measure is more directly influenced by the life cycle of each industry.  We include analyses 
using this alternative measure of entry barriers in the Appendix.  
7 Note that we also ran specifications that looked at the share of number of firms by industry, and found 
results that paralleled those derived from (3).  These results are available from the authors.  
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1.B.  Entry Regulation and Industry Margins 
It is possible that any effects uncovered by regressions (3) and (4) could be the result of 
‘artificial’ firm boundaries.  Under this hypothesis, industry structure is identical across 
all levels of entry regulation in actual functioning, but there are different demarcations 
‘on paper’ simply to avoid regulatory costs.  To test whether there is an impact on actual 
industry structure, we utilize a measure of operating margins, a dependent variable that 
directly reflects the ability of firms to set prices above costs.  We supplement (3) and (4) 
with a parallel set of regressions on margins, focusing once again on the interaction of 
‘natural’ entry barriers and regulation: 
 
(5)  Marginic= ￿i + ￿c + ￿* USTurnoveri*(Entry Regulation)c + ￿ic 
 
Since  high  entry  regulation  is  expected  to  have  a  greater  impact  on  market  power 
whenever natural barriers are low (i.e., turnover is high), we expect a positive coefficient 
in the interaction term in equation (5). 
 
1.C.  Entry Regulation and Response to Growth Opportunities 
We now consider the dynamic effects of entry regulation.  If a growth opportunity arises, 
entry regulation may prevent potential entrants from responding to the new opportunity.
8  
For  incumbents,  however,  the  opportunity  presents  a  chance  for  expansion, protected 
from the  competitive pressures that  would be present in less  regulated  environments.  
                                                 
8 If there exists an optimal firm size, from a technological perspective, all adjustment to demand shocks 
should take place through changes in the number of firms.  The possibility of supply shocks that affect 
optimal firm structure precludes any general statement on this point.  
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That is, high entry regulation will promote the expansion of firm size in response to 
growth opportunities, whereas low entry  regulation will promote an expansion in the 
number of firms where growth opportunities arise.  We examine the existence of this 
differential response by looking at the interaction terms in the following specifications: 
 
(6)  Growth(No. of Firms)ic= ￿i + ￿c +  
                          ￿*(Growth Opportunity)i*(Entry Regulation)c + ￿ic 
(7)  Growth(Avg. Firm Size)ic= ￿i + ￿c +  
                          ￿*(Growth Opportunity)i*(Entry Regulation)c + ￿ic 
 
Similar  to  the  previous  sections,  if  entry  regulation  distorts  responses  to  growth 
opportunities, we predict ￿ < 0 in (6) and ￿ > 0 in (7).  Estimating (6) and (7) requires a 
measure of global shocks to growth opportunities.  Following Fisman and Love (2003a), 
we use actual growth in the United States as a proxy.  The rationale is very similar to that 
described above: assuming that U.S. firms are in an institutional environment that allows 
them to optimally respond to growth opportunities, we may write: 
 
(8)  USGrowthi = (Global Growth Opportunity)i + ￿iUS 
 
That is, actual growth in the United States is a measure of global shocks to opportunities, 
plus some U.S.-specific shock ￿iUS.  We may then simply rewrite (6) and (7) as: 
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(9)  Growth(No. of Firms)ic= ￿i + ￿c +  
                          ￿*(USGrowth)i*(Entry Regulation)c + ￿ic 
(10)  Growth(Avg. Firm Size)ic= ￿i + ￿c +  
                          ￿*(USGrowth)i*(Entry Regulation)c + ￿ic 
 
 
2.  Data 
The data on regulation of entry of start-up firms are from DLLS (2002), which contains 
information on the regulations of 77 countries in 1999. Our choice for the measure of 
entry regulation includes the entire cost incurred by a prospective firm in order to obtain 
legal status to operate, as a fraction of per capita GDP. As described by DLLS, it includes 
all identifiable official expenses, together with the monetary value of the entrepreneur’s 
time.
9  We acknowledge that, although we limit ourselves to manufacturing industries, 
there is still very likely within-industry variation in regulation. Unfortunately, we have 
not  been  able  to  obtain  reliable  information  at  the  industry  level;  hence,  we  use  the 
country-level measure of entry regulation described above, keeping this caveat in mind. 
As our measure of natural entry barriers, we use firm turnover, as explained in the 
previous  section.  Following  the  intuition  of  RZ  of  interpreting  US  data  as  ‘industry 
representative’ of an optimal economy, we use US turnover data as our proxy for natural 
barriers of entry.
10 We obtain these data from Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988), 
which  contains  firm-level  entry  and  exit  data  based  on  U.S.  census  data;  we  define 
                                                 
9 This variable is identified as Cost + time in DLLS. 
10 Alternatively, we used average turnover ratios from a subset of 7 countries: Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
Norway, Portugal, UK and USA (as reported by Roberts, 1996). Our results are robust to this specification.  
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turnover as the simple sum of entry and exit, deflated by the number of firms in the 
industry.
11   
High-income countries may be expected to have technological characteristics that 
are more similar to those of U.S. firms.  Hence, U.S. turnover may be a better proxy for 
technological barriers to entry primarily for richer countries, and as a result, we may wish 
to restrict our analyses to wealthier countries in what follows.  We construct an auxiliary 
dummy variable called RICH which takes on a value of 1 if the country has per capita 
income greater than the median of our sample and zero otherwise.  Throughout, we will 
present results for both our full sample of countries, as well as the limited sample of 
countries with RICH=1.
12  The reasons for this are twofold: first, our U.S.-based proxies 
for  growth  opportunities  and  natural  barriers  are  more  applicable  to  more  advanced 
economies.  Also, since the UNIDO data are based on national industrial censuses, data 
from  countries  with  RICH=1  are  of  higher  quality  than  that  of  the  less  developed 
countries in the broader sample.
13 
Our outcome variables are derived from the United Nations’ UNIDO database, 
which  provides  data  on  production,  value-added,  number  of  employees,  number  of 
establishments and total wages bill, by industry, for a sample of 57 countries. We will use 
two country-industry specific outcome variables in our main regressions: average firm 
size, defined as the (log of the) ratio of industry value added to industry total number of 
establishments; and the (log of the) number of establishments in each industry.
14  The use 
                                                 
11 Dunne and Roberts (1986) provides a full description on the data construction. 
12 Countries that have been classified as RICH can be identified in Table 2. 
13 We also computed results using only OECD countries, which generated results very similar to those with 
RICH=1.  When the sample is limited to OECD firms with RICH=1, the results are even stronger than 
those reported in the text. 
14 These data are available for 52 out of the 57 countries. When merging this data with the regulation data 
from 77 countries, only 36 countries survive.  
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of logs allows for a relatively straightforward interpretation of coefficients as elasticities, 
and also attenuates the effect of any outliers.  Following Rajan and Zingales (1998)
15, we 
also include an industry’s share of total manufacturing production as a control, defined as 
industry value added generated to total manufacture value added.
16  Also to be consistent 
with  earlier  work,  we  use  the  industry  composition  utilized  by  RZ,  which  is  a 
combination of 3-  and  4-digit  ISIC industries.   All of the variables described in this 
paragraph are constructed using data from 1990. 
  The UNIDO data do not contain information on industry margins; to fill this gap, 
we utilize the World Scope Database (WSD), which provides firm-level data on public 
companies worldwide, representing over 96% of the world’s market value. We define 
margins as the ratio of operating income to total sales, and generate a measure of margins 
at the firm level by taking averages over all available years during 1991-97.  This is 
further collapsed to industry-country medians for some of the analyses that follow.  
Finally, for our analyses on industry-level responses to growth opportunities as a 
function  of  entry  regulation,  we  require  a  measure  of  industry-specific  growth 
opportunities.  Once again, we follow the intuition of RZ, using industry-level US sales 
growth as a measure of growth opportunities worldwide. As with turnover, we may be 
concerned that industry-specific shocks to growth opportunities will be more similar in 
countries at similar levels of economic development (see Fisman and Love, 2003b, for a 
discussion); hence, we will once again consider our results for both, the entire sample, as 
well as the sub sample of countries with RICH = 1. The dependent variables in this 
section are also similar to those used by RZ, and are simply the compounded industry-
                                                 
15 RZ hereafter. 
16 This variable varies with industry and country, and is therefore not absorbed by the inclusion of country 
and industry dummies.  
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level growth rates of average firm size and number of firms, as well as growth in value 
added, as defined above, during 1981-90.
17 
There may be some concerns that regulation is endogenous to industrial structure 
(entry regulation being a result of high industry concentration). Even though this is not 
likely to apply to our focus of analysis on the differential impact of regulation across 
different types of industries (see next section for more details), we address these concerns 
by undertaking an instrumental variables approach. In particular, we use legal origin, 
from La Porta et al (1998); as well, we utilize dummy variables reflecting majoritarian 
(versus proportional) and presidential (versus parliamentary) political systems.
18  
Finally,  we  will  consider  the  effect  of  other  regulation  on  industry  structure.  
According to the Public Choice theory of government intervention, any regulation may 
indeed serve as an entry barrier, and may therefore potentially have a distortionary effect 
on industry structure.  We use an index of labor regulation as our primary alternative 
measure of regulation, derived from Botero et al (2003), which measures the level of 
protection of labor and employment laws, taking into account availability of alternative 
employment  contracts,  conditions  of  employments  and  job  security.  As  a  coarser, 
alternative  summary  measure  of  regulation,  we  use  an  index  derived  from  Holmes, 
Johnson, and Kirkpatrick (1997). 
Table 1 provides details on the construction and source for each of our variables, 
and Table 2 lists summary statistics, by country and by industry. Panel A reports country-
level statistics; Panel B presents industry-level summary statistics of our main variables.  
 
                                                 
17 The reason for dropping the year 1980 is the amount of missing observation in some of our key variables. 
18 We thank Torsten Persson for providing us with these data.  
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3.  Results 
Before proceeding to regressions, we present some basic cross-tabulations to illustrate the 
patterns in the raw data.  In these cross-tabs, we limit observations to countries with 
RICH = 1, to control in a limited way for income effects.  In Table 3, we start by showing 
the data classified in high versus low turnover industries (where turnover is a proxy for 
natural entry barriers), and high versus low entry regulation countries.  Table 3(a) shows 
the total share in the number of firms for high versus low turnover industries.  A much 
larger number of firms are in high turnover industries, which is implied by the summary 
statistics  listed  in  Table  2.    Consistent  with  our  conjecture  on  the  impact  of  entry 
regulation,  the  differential  between  high  and  low  turnover  firms  is  much  smaller  for 
countries  with  high  entry  regulation.    Table  3  (b)  shows  a  similar  set  of  results  for 
average firm size, where we find that the gap between the size of firms in low versus high 
turnover industries is narrower for countries with high entry regulation.  Surprisingly, 
average firm size is larger overall in low entry regulation countries; in our regressions, 
however, all country-specific factors will be absorbed by fixed-effects, which will allow 
for a cleaner comparison on the differential effects of entry regulation by industry.  These 
results are illustrated in the two upper plots of Figure 1. Additionally, Table 3(c) shows 
that margins are indeed higher in low turnover industries, and that the gap is narrower in 
high regulation countries.  This simple cross-tabulation shows that average margins are 
lower in high regulation countries, but this will once again be absorbed by country-level 
fixed effects. 
  Table  3  (d)  and  (e)  show  cross  tabulations  that  illustrate  the  effects  of  entry 
regulation on firms’ responses to growth opportunities, by splitting the sample into high  
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and low growth opportunity industries (as measured by actual growth in the U.S.). In 
Table  3  (d),  we  look  at  growth  in  the  number  of  establishments;  we  observe  that  in 
general, the number of establishments grows more within industries with relatively higher 
growth opportunities. However, this differential is much greater in countries where entry 
regulation is low.  Finally, Table 3 (e) shows the growth rate in average establishment 
size, where we observe that industries located in countries with high entry regulation 
exhibit relatively higher growth rates in average establishment size in industries with 
higher growth opportunities. We plot these results in the lower section of Figure 1.  
 
3.A.  Entry Regulation and Industry Structure: Regression Results 
Our estimations of equation (3) and (4) are listed in Table 4.  In columns (1) and (2) of 
Panel A, we show our baseline results, for the full sample and without any additional 
controls.  The coefficients of interest are of the predicted signs, and are significant at least 
at the 5 percent level.  Furthermore, the magnitudes are large, and may be illustrated with 
the following thought experiment: In moving from Singapore, the country at the 25
th 
percentile of the distribution of entry barriers, to Peru, the country at the 75
th percentile, 
the difference between the number of firms in Paper and Allied Products (25
th percentile 
of USTurnover) and the number of firms in Industrial Machinery and Equipment (75
th 
percentile of USTurnover) narrows by 11.03 percent ((0.81 – 0.61)*(-0.28 + 0.68))*(-
1.379).  Similarly, the difference in average firm size narrows by 4.76 percent ((0.82 – 
0.61)*(- 0.28 + 0.68))*(0.595).
19  
                                                 
19 I.e., the slope relating number of firms to USTurnover is less positive in Peru than in Singapore, and the 
slope relating average firm size to USTurnover is less negative in Peru than in Singapore.  
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  We add log(GDP)*USTurnover as a control in columns (3) and (4), and find that 
the  size  of  our  coefficients  are  reduced  (in  absolute  values)  but  their  significance 
increases to the 1% level.  Finally, in columns (5) through (8), we restrict the sample to 
countries  with  RICH  =  1,  and  find  that  for  this  subsample  the  coefficients  show  a 
stronger and more significant effect on average firm size.
20  
In Panel B, we repeat the same set of regressions, but with Sector Shareic as the 
outcome variable.  Interestingly, this does not generate any significant coefficients once 
we control for the interaction of turnover with the GDP per capita.  Our standard errors in 
these regressions are not increased, relative to the preceding set of regressions, suggesting 
that the effect of regulation does not distort total intersectoral allocations.  Rather, the 
regulations affect industry structure through within-industry distortions. 
 
3.B.  Entry Regulation and Operating Margins: Regression Results 
We present our estimation of equation (5) in Table 5.  The coefficient on the interaction 
term  is  positive,  suggesting  that  entry  regulation  disproportionately  generates  market 
power for firms in high-turnover industries. It is highly significant in all regressions once 
we either control for the interaction of GDP per capita and turnover or when the sample is 
limited to the subset of “rich” countries.  A similar thought experiment to that described 
above suggests that in moving from Singapore to Peru, the gap in margins between ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ regulation industries increases by approximately 0.4 percentage points.   
 
3.C.  Entry Regulation and Responses to Growth Opportunities: Regression Results 
                                                 
20 In order to address a potential concern on the endogeneity of our control variable ‘sector share’, we also 
estimate these regressions without including such controls. The coefficients of interest remain significant at 
conventional levels in models (2) through (8).  
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To  analyze  the  dynamic  effects  of  entry  regulation,  we  turn  to  the  empirical  tests 
described in (9) and (10), and reported in Table 6. The full-sample regressions  yield 
significant  coefficients  in  the  regressions  examining  growth  in  the  number  of 
establishments: there is a smaller response to growth opportunities in those countries with 
higher  barriers  to  entry.  The  coefficients  in  the  regressions  examining  average 
establishment size are of the predicted sign, but not significant at conventional levels. 
However, when we limit the sample to countries with RICH = 1, both sets of coefficients 
are significant and of the predicted sign (see columns (5) and (6)). 
 
3.D.  Robustness Checks 
Instrumenting for Regulation 
There may be some concern that regulation is endogenous to industrial structure.  Thus, 
for example, countries with high industry concentration may have high entry regulation, 
because of lobbying.  Under a more benign interpretation, countries that differentially 
benefit from industrial concentration may choose high levels of regulation.  We begin by 
noting that this does not necessarily contaminate our results: we are interested exclusively 
in the differential impact of regulation across different types of industries, so that these 
interpretations  would  similarly  have  to  imply  differential  effects  across  industries  to 
account for our results.  To try to address these concerns, we consider several variables 
that describe a country’s legal and political structure as instruments.  In particular, we use 
legal origin, as popularized by La Porta et al (1998), as well as dummies that indicate 
whether a country has a presidential (versus parliamentary) political system and whether 
a  country  has  a  majoritarian  (versus  proportional  representation)  voting  structure.   
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Persson and Tabellini (2003) and others have argued that these variables significantly 
impact both the size of government, as well as the extent to which governments intervene 
in the economy. 
To be effective instruments, these variables must collectively be predictive of the 
extent of entry regulation, i.e., the instruments are significant in the first stage, and the 
instruments must only (differentially) affect our outcome variables through their impact 
on entry regulation.  While we cannot rule out the effect of government structure on 
industry  organization  outside  of  regulation,  this  is  the  most  natural  channel  through 
which  government  may  influence  industry  structure.    Now,  since  we  are  using  these 
variables as instruments for regulation interacted with either turnover or USgrowth, the 
instruments themselves will be interaction terms.  In the first stage, our collection of 
instruments is significant at the 1 percent level (based on an F-test); our presidential 
dummy interaction is not significant, but all others are individually significant.  In the 
second stages, reported for the sub sample of rich countries in Table 7, we find that the 
magnitudes of the coefficients generated by the instrumental variables approach are very 
similar to those in our OLS regressions.  Furthermore, with the exception of the results on 
margins, all coefficients remain significant at conventional levels. 
 
3.E.  Other Forms of Regulation 
In this paper, we have focused on the specific type of regulation that we expect to most 
directly impact industry structure, due to the effect on the fixed cost of entry, relative to 
production (fixed or marginal) costs.  However, our explanation could potentially apply 
to other types of indirect regulatory barriers to entry, which are correlated with entry  
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regulation.  We therefore wish to get a sense of whether regulation generally is distorting 
industrial structure by acting as a barrier to entry, or whether there is something special 
about regulation of entry.  We therefore provide an alternative set of results that examine 
the impact of labor regulations, based on the data collected by Botero et al (2003).  
In Table 8 we show the results of all our main regressions. In the interests of 
space, we report only those regressions considering the sub-sample of rich countries and 
those where GDP per capita interactions have been included. Given the entry regulation 
results, it is remarkable that none of the interaction terms involving labor regulation are 
significant.    We  have  also  repeated  these  regressions  using  the  overall  measure  of 
government  intervention  of  Holmes,  Johnson,  and  Kirkpatrick  (1997),  and  find  that 
almost all coefficients are insignificant at the 10 percent level. 
 
3.F.  Additional Robustness Checks 
As Djankov et al (2003) have noted, regulation is correlated with various other country-
level characteristics.  While the most obvious control, log(GDP per capita), is included in 
all  reported  specifications,  there  may  be  concerns  of  other  omitted  variables.    We 
therefore repeated our full set of regressions including interactions involving a number of 
additional  covariates  that  might  be  expected  to  impact  industry  structure.    First,  we 
consider interactions with a measure of financial market development, taken from Rajan 
and  Zingales,  defined  as  the  ratio  of  private  domestic  credit  and  stock  market 
capitalization to GDP.  As well, we consider the effect of including interactive controls 
utilizing the country-level measure of corruption developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Zoido-Lobatón (2003).  Finally, we try to control for overall bureaucratic quality using a  
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measure from Political Risk Services (1997).  In no case were any of the coefficients 
systematically significant.  Furthermore, the coefficients on the interaction terms reported 
above were uniformly unaffected by the inclusion of these additional interaction terms.
21 
  A second concern that affects the “average size” specification is that our measure 
of  firm  size  is  based  on  value  added,  which  incorporates  both  prices  and  quantities 
produced.  To ensure that these results are not driven purely by price effects, but signify 
‘real’ distortions, we repeat these specifications using employment-based measures of 
firm size, also derived from the UNIDO data.  These results are reported in Table AP1 of 
the Appendix, and parallel the firm size results based on firm value-added. 
As a final robustness check, we estimate analogous regressions using USEntry 
instead of USTurnover as a proxy for entry barriers. These results are listed in Table AP2 
of the Appendix; the coefficients in all regressions remain significant at conventional 
levels, and are generally larger in magnitude than those reported in the main text.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the distortions to the organization of industry caused by 
entry  regulation,  taking  advantage  of  heterogeneity  across  industries  in  their  natural 
barriers and growth opportunities to examine whether some industries are differentially 
affected in countries with high levels of entry regulation.  First, we consider the effect of 
entry regulation on the (static) structure of industry.  We find that in industries with high 
‘natural’ barriers to entry, as proxied by firm turnover in the U.S., entry regulation has 
little impact on the quantity and average size of firms in an industry.  By contrast, in 
                                                 
21 These results can be obtained from the authors.  
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industries with low ‘natural’ entry barriers, countries with high entry regulation have few, 
large firms, relative to less regulated economies.  We find no relation between ‘natural’ 
entry  barriers  and  overall  industry  share  of  manufacturing,  as  a  function  of  entry 
regulation.    Second,  utilizing  firm-level  data,  we  show  that  operating  margins  are 
relatively high in low barrier industries in high entry regulation countries (relative to high 
‘natural’  barrier  industries).    Finally,  we  examine  the  impact  of  entry  regulation  on 
industry dynamics, by analyzing the ability of industries to take advantage of shocks to 
growth opportunities, and find that in countries with high entry regulation, industries 
respond  to  growth  opportunities  through  the  expansion  of  existing  firms,  while  in 
countries with low entry regulation, the response is primarily through the creation of new 
firms; the total sectoral response is invariant to the level of regulation.  Overall, our 
results  provide  a  consistent  body  of  evidence  suggesting  that  regulation  distorts  the 
(within)  structure  of  industry,  promoting  industry  concentration,  but  does  not  have 
measurable effects on intersectoral allocations. 
It  is  worth  noting,  in  conclusion,  some  potential  policy  implications  of  our 
findings.    The  Public  Interest  view  does  allow  for  the  possibility  that  industrial 
organization may be distorted through the creation of regulatory entry barriers.  However, 
the particular form of regulations that we examine here, in contrast to the regulation of 
labor,  environmental  contaminants,  or  product  safety,  do  not  provide  obvious  social 
returns.  Therefore, the market power and distortions in industry structure that we report 
may  not be offset by  social  gains.  We leave  further  analysis on the  overall welfare 
implications of regulation as an area for further research. 
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Table 1 – Table 1 introduces variables abbreviations, definitions and sources 
 
Category  Abbreviation  Description and Sources 
Log (Avsz) 
Log  of  the  ratio  of  industry  value  added  to  industry  total 
number  of  establishments  in  each  industry  for  year  1990. 
The industry composition is a combination of 3- and 4-digit 
ISIC industries. From United Nations’ UNIDO database. 
Log (Number)  Log  of  the  number  of  establishments  in  each  industry  for 
year 1990. Source: UNIDO. 
Sector Share  By country measure of industry’s share of total value added 
in manufacturing sector in 1990. Source UNIDO. 
Margin 
Firms’  average  ratio  of  operating  income  to  total  assets 
during  the  period  1991-1997.  Source:  World  Scope 
Database. 
Growth_VA  Compounded  industry-level  growth  rate  of  value  added, 
during 1981-1990. Source UNIDO. 
Growth_No  Compounded  industry-level  growth  rate  of  number  of 





Compounded industry-level growth rate of  firms’ average 
size (as defined in the first line). Period 1981-1990. From 
UNIDO. 
Log (Avemp)  Log of the ratio of industry number of employees to industry 
number of establishments, year 1990. Source UNIDO. 
Alternative 
Dependent 
Variables  Gwth_Avemp  Compounded industry-level growth rate of the ratio defined 
above, during 1981-1990. Source: UNIDO. 
Entry_Reg 
Total costs incurred by a prospective firm in order to obtain 
status to operate, as a fraction of per capita GDP. It includes 
identifiable official expenses, as well as monetary value of 
the entrepreneur’s time. Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002). 
Turnover 
Sum  of  the  average  entry  and  exit  rates  for  the  US 
manufacturing sector over the period 1963-82. From Dunne, 
Roberts and Samuelson (1988). 
USGrowth 
Growth in real sales, industry-level median of firm average 
growth  rates  over  the  period  1981-1990  for  each  ISIC 
industry in the US. Source: Compustat. 
Log (GDPPC)  Log of GDP per capita, dollars in 1980.  
Rich 
Dummy variable which equals 1 if the country has per capita 
income  greater  than  the  median  in  the  sample  and  zero 
otherwise. 








Measures  the  level  of  protection  provided  by  labor  and 
employment  laws.  It  takes  into  account  availability  of 
alternative  employment  contracts,  conditions  of 
employments and job security. From Botero et al (2003). 
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Table  2  –  Table  2  Panel  A  shows  the  number  of  observations  by  country,  and 
summarizes country-level of entry barrier regulation. Entry_Reg is defined in Table 1. It 
ranges from 0.173 to 2.714. 
 
Country  Observations  Entry_Reg 
Australia (*)  36  0.0305 
Austria (*)  28  0.4208 
Belgium (*)  13  0.2318 
Brazil  13  0.4534 
Canada (*)  35  0.0225 
Chile  28  0.2428 
Colombia  36  0.3400 
Denmark (*)  28  0.1120 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  28  1.1699 
Finland (*)  36  0.1076 
France (*)  28  0.3550 
Greece (*)  36  0.7300 
India  30  0.8856 
Indonesia  36  1.0499 
Italy (*)  28  0.4482 
Jamaica  9  0.2839 
Japan (*)  28  0.2201 
Jordan  25  0.7929 
Kenya  24  0.7230 
Korea, Rep.  36  0.2707 
Malaysia  35  0.4325 
Mexico  26  0.8344 
New Zealand (*)  25  0.0173 
Norway (*)  35  0.1192 
Peru  28  0.5306 
Philippines  28  0.3737 
Portugal  34  0.4884 
Singapore (*)  27  0.2071 
Spain (*)  36  0.5010 
Sri Lanka  26  0.2892 
South Africa (*)  24  0.1884 
Sweden (*)  35  0.0776 
Turkey  36  0.3692 
United Kingdom (*)  36  0.0303 
Venezuela (*)  35  0.5220 
Zambia  18  0.7209 
 
(*) Included in the RICH countries subsample. 
  25 
Table 2 – Table 2 Panel B shows some industry-level summary statistics. It includes the 
mean level of turnover, and the mean values and growth rates of value added, total 
number of establishments and average size. It also includes the compounding growth 
rates for the last three variables. 
 
ISIC  






           
311  34  0.5520  5800.00  6175.53          1,705,429 
313  32  0.5520  1393.00  522.75          6,728,204 
314  32  0.4280  673.70  310.03        45,200,000 
321  33  0.7440  2652.00  2933.61          1,469,825 
322  32  0.8560  1226.00  2893.19             604,451 
323  29  0.6840  227.20  419.76             617,071 
324  30  0.6840  296.30  477.33          1,001,990 
331  29  0.9380  1257.00  2696.38             834,257 
332  33  0.9020  836.30  1851.85             627,089 
341  33  0.6130  2138.00  737.91          4,737,221 
342  33  0.9190  3357.00  2804.27          1,447,248 
351  30  0.6100  2972.00  359.40          7,146,255 
352  31  0.6100  3304.00  672.61          4,333,831 
353  26  0.6340  1414.00  21.88      129,000,000 
354  25  0.6340  224.40  107.24          3,256,232 
355  33  0.7330  903.10  408.09          2,751,022 
356  32  0.7330  1977.00  1474.56          1,271,827 
361  28  0.6510  353.80  353.00          3,165,247 
362  28  0.6510  669.70  209.21          3,931,853 
369  30  0.6510  2199.00  1785.50          1,793,126 
371  29  0.5960  3297.00  619.86          7,335,015 
372  29  0.5960  1205.00  370.03          8,723,221 
381  31  0.7840  4056.00  4704.42          1,089,325 
382  32  0.8380  7475.00  4221.09          1,841,720 
383  32  0.8120  7488.00  2239.94          3,567,359 
384  32  0.7920  6743.00  1277.03          4,890,212 
385  30  1.0710  816.10  474.67          2,037,780 
390  32  0.8120  797.60  1288.50             784,799 
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Table 2 – Panel B (Cont’d) 
 






         
311  32  0.0792  0.03  0.05 
313  30  0.0737  0.00  0.08 
314  29  0.0683  0.00  0.08 
321  31  0.0433  0.01  0.04 
322  30  0.0733  0.05  0.04 
323  28  0.0554  0.02  0.04 
324  28  0.0350  0.01  0.03 
331  27  0.0482  0.03  0.02 
332  30  0.0644  0.05  0.03 
341  31  0.0803  0.02  0.07 
342  30  0.0726  0.04  0.04 
351  29  0.0959  0.03  0.07 
352  30  0.0783  0.01  0.08 
353  25  0.0823  0.01  0.08 
354  23  0.0719  0.02  0.05 
355  31  0.0416  0.03  0.02 
356  29  0.0971  0.04  0.06 
361  26  0.0704  0.06  0.02 
362  27  0.0622  0.02  0.05 
369  29  0.0596  0.02  0.05 
371  27  0.0545  0.00  0.06 
372  27  0.0846  0.02  0.07 
381  30  0.0614  0.04  0.03 
382  30  0.0704  0.05  0.03 
383  30  0.0740  0.04  0.03 
384  30  0.0547  0.03  0.03 
385  27  0.0916  0.03  0.07 
390  30  0.0785  0.04  0.06  
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TABLE 3  
 
PANEL A: Shows the Average Number of Establishments 
 
Average 
Number of Establishments 
Low Entry Reg  High Entry Reg 
Low Turnover  0.2052  0.2952 
High Turnover  0.7066  0.6151 
 
PANEL B: Shows Firm Average Size (measured as the ratio of Industry Value Added to 
Industry Number of Establishments) 
 
Average 
Size (in Millions) 
Low Entry Reg  High Entry Reg 
Low Turnover  17,9409  13.6990 
High Turnover  2.1633  2.2822 
 




Low Entry Reg  High Entry Reg 
Low Turnover  0.0839  0.0587 
High Turnover  0.0755  0.0570 
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TABLE 3  CONT´D 
 
PANEL D: Shows the Growth rate of the Average Number of Establishments 
 
Average 
Number of Establishments 
Low Entry Reg  High Entry Reg 
Low Growth Opportunities  0.0037  0.0004 
High Growth Opportunities  0.0255  0.0035 
 




Low Entry Reg  High Entry Reg 
Low Growth Opportunities  0.0526  0.0509 




TABLE  4  –  Table  4  shows  the  regression  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  Entry  Regulation  and  Industry  Structure.  Avsz 
represents the Firm Average Size measured as the ratio of Industry Value Added to Industry Number of Establishments and Number 
measures the Industry Number of Establishments. All regressions include country and industry dummies. ***, ** and * represent 
coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors in brackets.  
 
PANEL A: Within-industry Effect 
 
Model  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Sample  All Countries  Rich Countries 
Dep. Variable  Log(Avsz)  Log(Number)  Log(Avsz)  Log(Number)  Log(Avsz)  Log(Number)  Log(Avsz)  Log(Number) 
                  
Turnover *  0.595**  -1.379***  0.555***  -1.000***  0.626***  -1.087***  0.631***  -0.902*** 
Entry_Reg  [0.237]  [0.251]  [0.177]  [0.180]  [0.204]  [0.215]  [0.179]  [0.233] 
                 
Turnover *      -0.057  0.535      0.027  0.945 
log(GDPPC)      [0.319]  [0.398]      [0.570]  [0.744] 
                  
Sector Share  8.719***  8.733***  8.763***  8.318***  9.356***  6.488***  9.351***  6.310*** 
  [1.491]  [1.860]  [1.485]  [1.745]  [1.502]  [1.975]  [1.521]  [1.930] 
                 
Constant  18.248***  -2.218***  17.108***  -1.956  13.026***  5.668***  13.903**  -4.816 
  [0.699]  [0.738]  [1.247]  [1.518]  [0.136]  [0.171]  [5.151]  [6.672] 
Observations  860  860  860  860  419  419  419  419 






TABLE 4 – CONT’D 
 
PANEL B: Inter-industry Effect 
 
Model  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Sample  All Countries  Rich Countries 
Dep. Variable  Sector Share  Sector Share  Sector Share  Sector Share 
         
Turnover *  -0.027***  0.001  -0.008  0.000 
Entry_Reg  [0.008]  [0.011]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
         
Turnover *    0.037**    0.043** 
log(GDPPC)    [0.015]    [0.018] 
         
Constant  -0.069**  -0.323***  -0.014  -0.149** 
   [0.025]  [0.110]  [0.029]  [0.069] 
Observations  958  958  478  478 







TABLE 5 – Table 5 shows the regression analysis of the relationship between Entry Regulation and Industry Margin. Margin is 
defined as the ratio of Operating Income over Sales. All regressions include country and industry dummies. ***, ** and * represent 
coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors in brackets.  
 
Model  -1  -2  -3  -4 
Sample  All Countries  Rich Countries 
Dep. Variable  Margin  Margin  Margin  Margin 
            
Turnover *  0,012  0.032**  0.038**  0.039*** 
Entry_Reg  [0.014]  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.013] 
            
Turnover *     0.028*    0,007 
log(GDPPC)     [0.015]    [0.026] 
            
Log Assets  0.007**  0.007**  0.011***  0.011*** 
   [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
            
Constant  -0,046  -0,059  0.107*  0,083 
   [0.073]  [0.072]  [0.053]  [0.110] 
            
Observations  1054  1054  585  585 






TABLE  6  –  Table  6  shows  the  regression  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  Entry  Regulation  and  Response  to  Growth 
Opportunities. Growth measures are taken for the period 1981 to 1990. Growth_VA, Growth_No and Growth_Avsz represent industry 
growth rates of Value Added, Number of Establishments and Average Size. All regressions include country and industry dummies. 
***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors in brackets.  
 
Model  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Sample  All Countries  Rich Countries 
Dep. Variable  Growth_VA  Growth_No  Growth_Avsz  Growth_VA  Growth_No  Growth_Avsz 
             
USGrowth*  -0.014  -0.143**  0.122  0.022  -0.195***  0.221** 
     Entry_Reg  [0.073]  [0.068]  [0.089]  [0.072]  [0.071]  [0.101] 
             
USGrowth*  0.018  0.041  -0.031  -0.013  -0.127  0.124 
     log(GDPPC)  [0.085]  [0.085]  [0.099]  [0.207]  [0.202]  [0.289] 
             
Sector Share  0.458***  0.291**  0.182  0.362***  0.027  0.326*** 
  [0.069]  [0.113]  [0.120]  [0.081]  [0.063]  [0.060] 
             
Constant  0.08  0.013  0.031  0.122  0.134  -0.015 
   [0.101]  [0.026]  [0.097]  [0.223]  [0.217]  [0.304] 
             
Observations  1012  906  870  543  477  477 









 TABLE 7 – Table 7 presents instrumental variable results.  The set of instruments includes a dummy for presidential political 
systems, a dummy for majoritarian voting structures, and dummies for legal origin, all interacted with USTurnover in models (1) – (4) 
and interacted with USGrowth in models (5) – (7).  In all regressions, the sample is limited to countries with RICH=1.  The same sets 
of  controls  are  included  as  in the  preceding  regressions.  All  regressions  include  country  and  industry  dummies.  ***,  **  and * 
represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
Model  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Dep. Variable  Log(Avsz)  Log(Number) Sector Share  Margin  Growth(Avsz) Growth(No)  Growth(VA) 
                
Turnover *  0.56***  -1.10***  0.017**  0.043       
Entry_Reg  [0.179]  [0.220]  [0.0078]  [0.028]       
               
USGrowth*           0.178***  -0.161***  0.020 
Entry_Reg          [0.066]  [0.055]  [0.061] 
                
Observations  419  419  478  2580  477  477  543 













 Table 8 – Table 8 presents a summary of all previous regressions using Regulation of Labor. The sample is limited to countries with 
RICH=1.  The same sets of controls are included as in the preceding regressions. All regressions include country and industry 
dummies. ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
Model  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dep. Variable  Log(Avsz)  Log(Number)  Margin  Growth_VA  Growth_No  Growth_Avsz 
             
Turnover *  -0.315  -0.968  0.057       
Labor_reg  [0.612]  [0.596]  [0.040]       
             
USGrowth *        0.072  -0.343  0.356 
Labor_reg        [0.190]  [0.230]  [0.331] 
Turnover *  -1.123*  2.003**  0.045        log(GDPPC)  [0.529]  [0.669]  [0.031]                      USGrowth        -0.004  -0.037  -0.003  log(GDPPC)        [0.203]  [0.216]  [0.344]                Log Assets      0.003**              [0.001]                      Sector Share  9.335**  6.101**    0.366**  0.01  0.343**    [1.381]  [1.906]    [0.082]  [0.065]  [0.065]                Constant  24.577**  -14.879*  -0.43  0.093  0.145  0.006    [4.847]  [6.151]  [0.308]  [0.252]  [0.275]  [0.431]  Observations  419  419  2058  543  477  477 








TABLE AP1 – Table AP1 presents a robustness checks. Average Employment represents the ratio of industry Employees to industry 
Number of Establishments. The sample is limited to countries with RICH=1.  The same sets of controls are included as in the 
preceding regressions. All regressions include country and industry dummies. ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 




Model  (1)  (2) 
Dep. Variable  Log(Avemp)  Gwth_Avemp 
     
Turnover *  0.558**   
Entry_Reg  [0.232]   
     
USGrowth *    0.174** 
Entry_Reg    [0.083] 
Turnover *  0.075    log(GDPPC)  [0.377]          USGrowth *    0.362  log(GDPPC)    [0.222]        Sector Share  4.329*  0.122    [1.739]  [0.063]        Constant  3.445  -0.384    [3.321]  [0.234]  Observations  419  477 





Table AP2 – Table AP2 shows the regression analysis of the relationship between Entry Regulation and Industry Structure, using 
“USEntry” rate instead of “USTurnover” rate as a proxy (inverse) of natural entry barriers. Avsz represents the Firm Average Size 
measured as the ratio of Industry Value Added to Industry Number of Establishments and Number measures the Industry Number of 
Establishments.  The  sample  is  limited  to  countries  with  RICH=1.    The  same  sets  of  controls  are  included  as  in  the  preceding 
regressions. All regressions include country and industry dummies. ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively. Standard errors in brackets.  
  
 
Model  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Dep. Variable  Log(Avsz)  Log(Number)  Log(Avsz)  Log(Number) Sector Share Sector Share  Margin  Margin 
                 
Entry *  1.096***  -1.912***  1.074***  -1.414***  -0.009  0.005  0.0184**  0.0213** 
   Entry Reg  [0.263]  [0.286]  [0.218]  [0.298]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.008]  [0.008] 
                 
Entry *      -0.111  2.529**    0.079***    0.0780* 
   GDPPC      [0.783]  [1.096]    [0.027]    [0.041] 
                 
Observations  404  404  404  404  460  460  2058  2058 









Figure 1 – Figure 1 summarizes the differential response to entry regulation. The vertical line shows the median entry regulation. 
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